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GOOD FAITH CONCURRENT TRADEMARK
USE: HOW THE NINTH CIRCUIT TOOK A




COMMON law concurrent trademark use is based on the judiciallycreated Tea Rose–Rectanus doctrine.1 Although the Lanham Acthas codified much of trademark law,2 courts today still apply
some old common law concepts, including the Tea Rose–Rectanus doc-
trine.3 However, courts have not uniformly interpreted this doctrine,
which has caused a circuit split concerning the doctrine’s good faith re-
quirement.4 In Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., the Ninth
Circuit weighed in on whether, under the Tea Rose–Rectanus doctrine, a
junior user’s knowledge of a senior user’s prior use of a trademark com-
pletely destroys good faith or is a mere factor to consider in determining
good faith.5 The court followed the lead of the Seventh Circuit and
Eighth Circuit and went against the Fifth Circuit and Tenth Circuit when
it held that a junior user’s prior knowledge of a senior user’s prior use
defeats any claim of good faith for Tea Rose–Rectanus purposes.6 This
note contends that in light of modern technology and the digital market
retailers now find themselves in, the Ninth Circuit was correct in holding
that knowledge of prior use destroys any claim of good faith because se-
nior users merit greater protection in the internet era of today.
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2020; B.S., Business Marketing,
Arizona State University, 2016.
1. Robert Nupp, Concurrent Use of Trademarks on the Internet: Reconciling the Con-
cept of Geographically Delimited Trademarks with the Reality of the Internet, 64 OHIO ST.
L.J. 617, 624 (2003).
2. Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012).
3. See, e.g., Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 426, 437 (9th
Cir. 2017).
4. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n for Healthcare Commc’ns, Inc. v. Cent. Ark. Area Agency on
Aging, Inc., 257 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir. 2001); GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 541
(10th Cir. 1990).
5. Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 439.
6. Id. at 437; see Nat’l Ass’n for Healthcare Commc’ns, Inc., 257 F.3d at 735; Money
Store v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 674–75 (7th Cir. 1982); cf. C.P. Interests, Inc. v.
Cal. Pools, Inc., 238 F.3d 690, 700 (5th Cir. 2001); GTE Corp., 904 F.2d at 541.
327
328 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
The Tea Rose–Rectanus doctrine comes from the common law and was
formed through two Supreme Court cases, both of which took place in
the early twentieth century.7 The main proposition of the doctrine is that
“common-law trademark rights extend only to the territory where a mark
is known and recognized, so a later user may sometimes acquire rights in
pockets geographically remote from the first user’s territory.”8 The Lan-
ham Act has significantly limited the application of this doctrine, giving
nationwide protection to a user with federal registration,9 yet the doctrine
still has applicability where the junior user establishes common law rights
prior to the senior user’s federal registration.10
The dispute in Stone Creek centered around two furniture manufactur-
ers. Stone Creek, a furniture manufacturer with five showrooms in the
Phoenix, Arizona area, sold directly to its customers.11 In 1990, Stone
Creek began using the STONE CREEK mark, for which it obtained state
trademark protection two years later.12 Omnia manufactured leather fur-
niture and entered into an agreement with Stone Creek in which Omnia
would manufacture leather furniture with the STONE CREEK mark,
and Stone Creek would buy such furniture to sell in its own stores.13 The
parties operated under this agreement until 2013, when Stone Creek dis-
covered Omnia had been using the STONE CREEK mark on competing
furniture.14 Every piece of furniture bearing the unauthorized STONE
CREEK mark was sold in the Midwest.15 Even though Stone Creek had
no physical locations in this region, it reported that $610,384 of its sales
since inception took place in the Midwest.16 The district court ruled in
favor of Omnia on the basis that it did not commit infringement because
the court found there was no likelihood of confusion;17 thus, the district
court never reached the issue of good faith under the Tea Rose–Rectanus
doctrine.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit first addressed whether or not Omnia’s
use created a likelihood of confusion, which the court called “[t]he touch-
stone for trademark infringement.”18 Employing a “reasonably prudent
marketplace consumer” standard, the court cited its own precedent and
applied the Sleekcraft19 factors in determining if Omnia’s use had created
7. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 103–04 (1918); Hano-
ver Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 419–20 (1916).
8. Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 436.
9. Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2012).
10. Id. § 1115(a).
11. Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 429.
12. Id. at 429–30.
13. Id. at 430.
14. Id.
15. Specifically, sales took place in portions of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Id.
16. Id. at 434.
17. Id. at 431.
18. Id.
19. AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979).
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a sufficient likelihood of confusion.20 After performing a thorough analy-
sis of each factor, the court ultimately concluded the district court had
erred in holding there was no likelihood of confusion and that there was
no “substantial argument” that Omnia’s use did not create a likelihood of
confusion.21
As the court stated, Omnia used an identical mark on identical goods,
which essentially constituted “slam-dunk evidence” of a likelihood of
confusion.22 After concluding that defendant’s use did create a likelihood
of confusion and that there was in fact infringement, the court turned to
Omnia’s affirmative defense of the Tea Rose–Rectanus doctrine.23 Be-
cause Omnia began using the mark in 2008, and Stone Creek did not
obtain federal registration until 2012, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
Omnia was not automatically put on constructive notice under the Lan-
ham Act and that “the Tea Rose–Rectanus defense is available to Omnia
if it is applicable.”24
As the court pointed out, to employ the Tea Rose–Rectanus doctrine,
the junior user is required to “establish good faith use in a geographically
remote area.”25 In addressing the good faith issue and in deciding which
side of the split the Ninth Circuit should land on, the court engaged in a
textual analysis of the origins and policy of the Tea Rose–Rectanus doc-
trine and also performed a statutory analysis with regard to the Lanham
Act.26 The court cited both Tea Rose and Rectanus, acknowledging that in
both cases “the Supreme Court emphasized that the junior user had no
awareness of the senior user’s use of the mark” when analyzing good
faith.27 The court went on to note that the Supreme Court in Tea Rose
stated that “the junior user ‘adopted and used [the trademark] in good
faith without knowledge or notice that the name “Tea Rose” had been
adopted or used . . . by anybody else.’”28 The text of the Tea Rose opin-
ion clearly indicates that knowledge, or lack thereof, is the crux of good
faith use.29 Therefore, the court concluded that Supreme Court precedent
indicated that knowledge is at the heart of good faith.30
The Ninth Circuit then distinguished its holding from the reasoning
used by the opposing circuits, which put emphasis on the intent of the
20. Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 431. These factors are (1) the similarity of the marks
and proximity of the goods, (2) the strength of the protected mark, (3) evidence of actual
confusion, (4) convergence of marketing channels, (5) intent in selecting the allegedly in-
fringing mark, (6) the degree of consumer care, and (7) likelihood of product expansion.
Id. at 432.





26. Id. at 437, 439.
27. Id. at 437 (emphasis added).
28. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403,
410 (1916)).
29. See id.; Hanover Star, 240 U.S. at 410.
30. Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 438.
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second user.31 In contrast, the Stone Creek court ruled that although the
Tea Rose case did include some language indicating some concern with
intent, knowledge remained the central focus.32 The court based this rea-
soning on the fact that the intent language was used merely once in the
Tea Rose opinion, but good faith and knowledge were consistently tied
together in both the Tea Rose and Rectanus opinions.33
Next, the Ninth Circuit considered the policy the Tea Rose–Rectanus
doctrine was originally meant to promote.34 The court recognized that
“the Tea Rose–Rectanus doctrine operates to protect a junior user who
unwittingly adopted the same mark and invested time and resources into
building a business with that mark.”35 Then, the court went on to prop-
erly note that a junior user does not innocently choose a mark when the
junior party has affirmative knowledge of the senior user’s prior use, but
instead acts directly against the senior user, “potentially blocking the se-
nior user from entering into the new market.”36 Thus, the court held
Omnia acted in bad faith.37
Finally, the court analyzed how the knowledge standard coincides with
the Lanham Act.38 The Lanham Act codified the Tea Rose defense by
affording junior users protection from senior users bringing suit if the
junior user adopted the mark “without knowledge of the registrant’s
prior use.”39 However, the Act limits the doctrine by putting junior users
on constructive notice of prior use if a party obtains federal registration
for a mark.40 In the court’s opinion, if the Lanham Act considered con-
structive notice sufficient, then actual notice would certainly be sufficient
as well.41
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Stone Creek correctly interpreted judi-
cial and legislative intent to promote and protect business growth, and as
a result, brought the Tea Rose–Rectanus doctrine into modernity. As
noted, the Tea Rose–Rectanus doctrine was developed in the early twenti-
eth century,42 a time when two retailers could very likely operate using
highly similar marks and have no knowledge of the other’s use. Moreo-
ver, this was a time when it was much harder for a small retailer to enter
31. See, e.g., GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 541 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that
knowledge of prior use did not end the inquiry, but that “the ultimate focus is on whether
the second user had the intent to benefit from the reputation or good will of the first
user”).
32. Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 438.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 438–39.
36. Id. at 439.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5) (2012).
40. See id.
41. Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 439.
42. See id. at 436.
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into new markets due to geographic restrictions.43 This difficulty was part
of why the Supreme Court developed the doctrine—to protect unknow-
ing junior users who had invested resources into establishing good will in
a geographically remote market, thus inflicting minimal, if any, harm on
the senior user.44 Yet, in today’s time, a geographically remote area for
retailers is consistently shrinking as small business retailers are now able
to reach national, and even global markets, through use of the internet.45
The Supreme Court in the Tea Rose case stated, “[w]e are not dealing
with a case where the junior appropriation of a trademark in occupying
territory that would probably be reached by the prior user in the natural
expansion of his trade.”46 This illustrates the Court’s concern for a senior
user’s ability to expand into new markets. The Stone Creek court ex-
pressed similar concern in its decision, acknowledging “a user like Omnia
knows that its actions come directly at the expense of the senior user,
potentially blocking the senior user from entering into the new
market.”47
The Stone Creek court’s concern about the potential for a senior user to
be incapable of entering a new market is well justified in the modern
digital retail age. While it is true that not all retailers utilize the internet,
the trend is growing and shows no signs of slowing down. The National
Retail Federation (NRF) predicts that the growth of the online retail
market will “dwarf” the growth of the entire retail market.48 Addition-
ally, in 2016, global online retail sales constituted 7.4% of all retail spend-
ing.49 This percentage is expected to grow to 8.8% this year.50 To put this
in perspective, that would be an increase from $1.88 trillion in total retail
sales to $2.489 trillion.51 Clearly, the online retail market is growing rap-
idly, meaning more and more retailers are now able to access and enter
markets outside of their geographic origin with ease. But this was cer-
tainly not the case when the Tea Rose–Rectanus doctrine originated.52
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit’s holding properly gives senior users the
broader protection they need in today’s digital market.
43. See ART CARDEN, RETAIL INNOVATIONS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY: THE
RISE OF MASS-MARKET MERCHANDISERS 2 (2012), https://www.independent.org/pdf/work
ing_papers/79_retail_innovations.pdf.
44. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 103–04 (1918); see
also Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415–16 (1916).
45. See Anne Gilson LaLonde & Jerome Gilson, Proving Ownership Online . . . and
Keeping It: The Internet’s Impact on Trademark Use and Coexistence, 104 TRADEMARK
REP. 1275, 1296 (2014).
46. Hanover Star, 240 U.S. at 420 (emphasis added).
47. Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 439.
48. National Retail Federation Estimates 8-12% US E-Commerce Growth in 2017, BUS.
INSIDER (Feb. 10, 2017, 11:43 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/national-retail-federa
tion-estimates-8-12-us-e-commerce-growth-in-2017-2017-2.





52. See LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 45, at 1296.
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As the court acknowledged, Stone Creek made over $600,000 in sales
in a geographic region in which they had no physical presence.53 Com-
mon sense suggests that at least a portion of these sales can be attributed
to Stone Creek’s website,54 which it has operated since at least 2000.55
Given the increasing dominance of online retail, Stone Creek stands to
potentially make more and more sales in regions where they have no
physical presence. The same holds true to local retailers across the coun-
try as the internet enhances their ability to reach geographically distant
markets; thus, their trademark rights in turn deserve broader protection.
This note does not suggest that the Tea Rose defense should be com-
pletely eliminated, merely that it should be reserved for the narrow cir-
cumstance where a junior user has no knowledge of any prior use and
innocently adopts a mark already in use.
Additionally, in contrast to the Tenth Circuit in GTE Corp. v. Wil-
liams,56 which held that the second user’s intent to benefit from the repu-
tation or goodwill of the prior user was the primary focus in a good faith
determination,57 the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Stone Creek better re-
flects the real-world practical considerations of modern-day secondary
use. The Tenth Circuit’s reasoning revolves around the idea that even if a
junior user has knowledge of a mark’s prior use, that junior user may still
have good faith if it did not adopt the mark with the intent to benefit
from the senior user’s reputation.58 This proposition had more validity at
the time the Tea Rose–Rectanus doctrine was developed, when it was
conceivable that a junior user with affirmative knowledge of a prior use
had no intention of benefitting from the senior user’s prior use because
the senior user was geographically remote and therefore had no estab-
lished goodwill or potential for expansion in the junior user’s intended
market.59 However, the advent of the internet has crippled this justifica-
tion. As retailers are now able to promote their trademarks easily around
the world through the internet, it follows that a junior user’s affirmative
knowledge of prior use is highly indicative of its intent to benefit from the
reputation of the senior user.60 Indeed, it is hard to imagine a situation
today, given the modern digital market, where a junior user could make a
legitimate argument that it did not intend to derive benefit from the se-
nior user’s reputation despite having knowledge of prior use. In essence,
the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning is outdated, and the Ninth Circuit’s holding
is more in tune with the reality of the modern world.
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion also correctly interprets legislative intent as
it applies to limiting the Tea Rose–Rectanus defense in modern times.
53. Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 426, 434 (9th Cir. 2017).
54. STONE CREEK FURNITURE, https://stonecreekfurniture.com/ (last visited Dec. 27,
2018).
55. Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 434.
56. 904 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1990).
57. Id. at 541.
58. Id.
59. See LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 45, at 1294–95.
60. See Stone Creek Inc., 875 F.3d at 439.
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Under the Lanham Act, federal registration of a mark provides “con-
structive notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership.”61 According to
the former United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (now the
Federal Circuit), this provision is a clear example of the legislature’s in-
tent to “provide for a thriving business environment by granting nation-
wide protection to expanding businesses.”62 Studies have shown that the
profitability of companies around the globe has gone up by 10% due to
internet usage.63 Half of this increase is attributed to business growth.64
Furthermore, the internet has given small businesses “equal footing” with
bigger players, granting them the ability to compete in newer markets.65
Thus, it follows that businesses with an online presence are generally ex-
panding, making them exactly what the legislature intended to protect.
As a result, the Ninth Circuit correctly narrowed the Tea Rose–Rectanus
defense considering the intent of Congress, and this holding is buttressed
in light of the effect the internet has had on businesses.
In conclusion, because modern retailers through the internet can easily
access new and distant markets, which geography previously denied
them, courts should follow the Ninth Circuit’s sound holding in Stone
Creek and narrow the Tea Rose–Rectanus doctrine. Although the Tea
Rose–Rectanus doctrine may still have applicability even in this digital
era, a narrow interpretation of junior user good faith is necessary. The
internet provides junior users with the ability to easily search for similar
marks they intend to adopt. Balancing this ease with the harm of prevent-
ing a senior user from successfully entering a new market clearly weighs
in favor of the senior user. Promoting business stability and continued
growth is key in ensuring a healthy economy and supporting a central
legislative concern.66 The courts of this country should do all they can to
support that endeavor.
61. Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (2012).
62. Application of Beatrice Foods Co., 429 F.2d 466, 472–73 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
63. See Elena-Iulia Apa˜va˜loaie, The Impact of the Internet on the Business Environ-
ment, in 15 PROCEDIA ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 955 (2014).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 956.
66. See Application of Beatrice Foods Co., 429 F.2d at 472–73.
